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TRIAL JUDGE'S DUTY TO CALL WITNESSES
IN RES IPSA LOQUITUR CASES"
IN an effort to elicit more complete testimony, trial judges often depart
from the passive role of umpire to call witnesses both in criminal' and civiF
actions. A recent dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Johnsoe
v. United States3 suggests a further broadening of the trial judge's role by
making his failure to call material wvitnesses in cases involving res ipsa loquitur
grounds for a new trial.4
In the Johnson case a seaman sought to recover under the Jones Act* for
injuries caused by the alleged negligence of a fellow-servant. Plaintiff relied
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,0 arguing that the instrument which caused
* Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46 (1943).
1. Courts will call witnesses when the State is unvilling to vouch for their credi-
bility, e.g., People v. Peterson, 364 Ill. 80, 4 N.E2d 37 (1936), and will call e~xert
witnesses and eyewitnesses to crimes. E.g., State v. Home, 191 N.C. 787, 83 S.E. 433
(1916) (expert witnesses) ; Young v. United States, 107 F2d 490 (5th Cir. 1939) (eye-
witnesses to crimes). See in general cases cited 9 WmIouzn, EvmzDx §2484 (3d ed.
1940) ; MODEL CODE OF EvnaxcE (1942), Comment to Rule 105 (d) : ... . a judge may
call a witness of his own motion or at the request of a party in both civil and criminal
cases."
The general judicial power which is expressly allotted in every state constitution im-
plies the power to investigate, summon, and question witnesses. 9 NVXox-xo. Evm-rac
§ 2484. See Notes, 42 HARv. L. RaV. 445 (1929), 27 MCE. L. REV. 354 (1929), 15 Mr. z;.
L. REv. 350 (1931), IS TEx. L. REV. 530 (1940).
2. Marin Water & Power Co. v. R. R. Commission of Cal., 171 Cal. 706, 154 Pac.
864 (1916) (upholding power of a commission, as a judicial tribunal, to call witnesses) ;
Merchants Bank v. Goodfellow, 44 Utah 349, 140 Pac. 759 (1914) (in a suit by barl: on
a bill of exchange, court permitted to call and question last endorser of bill). Sce Herron
v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U. S. 91, 95 (1931); Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Chal-
mette Oil Distributing Co., 143 F.2d 826, 82-9 (5th Cir. 1944). Contra: South Covington
& Cincinnati Ry. v. Stroh, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1807, 66 S. IV. 177 (1902) (court had no
power to present expert testimony above the objection of one party).
3. 333 U. S. 46, 50 (1948).
4. Id. at 53.
5. 38 STAT. 1185 (1915), as amended, 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. §6 S
(1946): "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law ... and in such actions all
statutes ... modifying or e-x-tending the common-law right or remedy in cases of per-
sonal injury to railway employees shall apply."
Although the Jones Act contains no consent on the part of the United States to be
sued, seamen may pursue their Jones Act remedy against the government under the Suits
in Admiralty Act, 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 741-52 (1946), but only in admiralty
by a libel in personam. Sevin v. Inland Waterways Corp., ES F.2d 9S3 (5th Cir. 1937).
See Crescitelli v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 894, 896 (E. D. Pa. 1946) and Baker v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, 57 F. Supp. 207, 208 (N. D. Cal. 1944). See also Willocl,
Commentary on1 Maritime Workers, 46 U. S. C. A. 211, 258 (1944).
6. The necessary elements of a res ipsa loquitur case are listed in Pr.ossrn, Toars
291 (1941) : "The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone's negligence, and it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control
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the accident was under the exclusive control of the defendant's servant and
that the accident would not ordinarily have occurred without the servant's
negligence.7 Although neither party had called the allegedly negligent fellow-
servant,8 who was the sole witness of the accident, the Supreme Court held
that res ipsa loquitur applied and sustained the plaintiff's claim. Dissenting
along with Justices Jackson and Burton on grounds not discussed in the ma-
jority opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued that res ipsa loquitur was in-
applicable since the court had failed to call a witness who might have been able
to explain the cause of the accident.
While the power to call witnesses has generally been recognized as a valid
exercise of the trial judge's discretion,9 appellate courts have usually rejected
the doctrine set forth by Mr. Justice Frankfurter on grounds that appellant's
prior opportunity to subpoena the witness makes a new trial unjustified. 10 The
only direct authority for his position comes from Mississippi where the Su-
preme Court has three times reversed its chancery bench for failure to elicit
pertinent facts not presented by either party. 1 One court has suggested that
in criminal trials the judge might be under a duty to call eyewitnesses not
subpoenaed by either party.12
Although Mr. Justice Frankfurter's reform would undoubtedly lead to
securing more testimony, it would be accompanied by questionable conse-
quences in the field of accident liability. The recent history of accident law
reveals an increased use of the evidentiary rule of res ipsa loquitur in the
of the defendant, and the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated." For general discussion, see Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res
Ipsa Loquitur, 1 U. oF Ci. L. REv. 519 (1934); Niles, Pleading Res Ipsa Loquiturl, 7
N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 415 (1929); Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur,
20 MINN. L. REv. 241 (1936).
7. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States Supreme Court, No. 138, October
term, 1947, pp. 20-4.
8. Although the witness' deposition had been taken, it had not been introduced in
evidence, apparently because it contained mhterial harmful to both sides. The plaintiff
argued that he was under no duty to present adverse witnesses while the government
claimed that the witness should have been called by the plaintiff since the plaintiff had
the burden of proving negligence. See opinion of lower court, 160 F.2d 789, 791 (9th
Cir. 1947).
9. See notes 1 and 2 stspra.
10. Outside of the Mississippi Chancery Court, reversal because of a judge's failure
to probe for evidence seems to have been sought on only five occasions and all appeals
were unsuccessful. Steinberg v. United States, 162 F.2d 120 (5th cir. 1947); United
States v. Pape, 144 F2d 778 (2d cir. 1944) ; Hirschfeld v. United States, 54 F.2d 62 (7th
cir. 1931) ; People v. Burke, 382 IIl. 488, 48 N. E.2d 415 (1943) ; Halloran-Judge Trust
Co. v. Carr, 62 Utah 10, 218 Pac. 138 (1923). Wigmore, without annotation, dismisses
the idea that it is a judge's duty to call witnesses: "That [the judge] has no burden or
duty of doing so is plain in the law." 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2484.
11. Moore v. Sykes' Estate, 167 Miss. 212, 149 So. 789 (1933) ; Kirby v. Gay, 136
Miss. 781, 101 So. 705 (1924) ; Stoner & Co. v. Blocton Export Coal Co., 135 Miss. 390,
100 So. 5 (1924). None of these is a res ipsa loquitur case.
12. See People v. Baskin, 254 Ill. 509, 513, 98 N. E. 957, 959 (1912).
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judicially sanctioned trend to facilitate compensation of accident victims.13
Mlr. Justice Frankfurter's proposal clearly cuts across this current by diminish-
ing the practical effectiveness of res ipsa loquitur as an aid to plaintiffs.1 4
Resulting testimony of any witness called by the court might prove specific
acts of negligence, but this possible advantage is of small value to the plaintiff:
res ipsa loquitur as a rule of circumstantial evidence already provides at least
an inference of negligence,'3 and the additional testimony might eliminate
some element"6 on which that inference is based or might overcome it by show-
ing due care on the part of the employer. Moreover, a defendant could leave
dubious witnesses, whom he would be inclined to call under the present sys-
tem,17 to be called by the court, and thereby gain not only the benefit of the
witness' affirmative evidence in his behalf, but in addition, the valuable op-
portunity to cross-examinei s with its attendant power to impeach1 and ask
13. For an excellent analysis of recent trends away from the strict logic of "fault"
and the role of res ipsa loquitur in that trend, see James, Accidcnt Liability: Some IWar-
thne Deaelopments, 55 YA=. L. J. 365, 318-93 (1946). The best discussion of the pro-
cedural advantages obtained by res ipsa loquitur is in Prosser, The Procchural Effect of
Res Ipsa Loquitur, supra note 6.
14. A Jones Act case would appear to be particularly unsuitable for the proposal of a
doctrine which will impede the recovery of plaintiff seamen. Although the Act is unques-
tionably a "fault" statute, its essentially remedial purpose in making compensation avail-
able to injured seamen is hardly furthered by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's new doctrine.
See Comment, 57 Y= L. J. 243, 258 (1947). Moreover, it may be assumed that the
"negligence" under this remedial statute was intended to be construed no more stringently
than in other cases. Res ipsa loquitur is a creature of judicial invention designed ex-
pressly to assist plaintiffs in situations where the evidence would not otherwise permit
them to win. In Mr. Justice Frankfurter's suggestion there is a subordination of the
pragmatic results of res ipsa loquitur to the debatable objective of ascertaining strict
fault.
15. The minirnum effect given to res ipsa loquitur, that of a permissible inference of
negligence, prevails in the federal courts and in the majority of jurisdictions. See Car-
penter, s, ra note 6, at 523. A defendant is under no duty to introduce evidence to over-
come the res ipsa loquitur case, but if he fails to introduce evidence, "the plaintiff will
be entitled to have the jury consider under proper instructions whether or not the facts
shown warrant them in making the inference that the defendant was guilty of the negli-
gence which caused the injury." Ibid. And even if some explanation is offered, applica-
tion of the doctrine permits a finding of fact favorable to the plaintiff in many cases
which he would otherwise lose as a matter of law.
16. See note 6 supra.
17. It seems likely that the witness ultimately callcd by the judge would be one whom
the defendant, if anyone, would otherwise have called, since the plaintiff has little incentive
to risk the testimony of an equivocal witness when res ipsa loquitur is available to assist
his case. The defendant, on the other hand, often must take the risk of calling an equiv-
ocal witness to overcome the effect of res ipsa loquitur.
18. Decisions upholding a trial judge's right to call witnesses also uphold the right
of both parties to cross-examine. See, e.g., Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Chalmette Oil
Distributing Co., 143 F.2d 826, K9 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Litsinger v. United States, 44 F.2d
45, 47 (7th Cir. 1930). See cases cited 3 ,VGmonE, EvmE:rcE § 918 n.3.
19. The right of impeachment by both parties when a judge calls a witness is particu-
larly significant in criminal cases. See 3 WIGMOV, Evwa.,cN § 918. But this right is
1948]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
leading questions. 20 And while reversal for the trial judge's failure to call a
material witness could deprive either the plaintiff or the defendant of a favor-
able trial verdict, plaintiffs as a class would be more seriously harmed because
of the larger incidence of verdicts for plaintiffs in negligence actions2 1 and
the likelihood of a still larger incidence in res ipsa loquitur cases.
But the full effect of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's proposal would not be
limited to substantive changes in accident law. Res ipsa loquitur cases would
be plagued with administrative problems far outweighing the possible eviden-
tiary advantages of calling equivocal witnesses. An obligation to call wit-
nesses established, the trial court will to that extent be forced to undertake ac-
tive investigatory duties, however ill-equipped it may be, as presently consti-
tuted, to perform this function. How, during a trial, is he to locate witnesses
and pass on their importance? This inability of a judge to determine and call
all material witnesses would enable parties to hold back witnesses and then
use the judge's failure to call as grounds for reversal. The resulting burden
of never-ending litigation would weigh especially heavily on financially lim-
ited plaintiffs, typically the complainants in res ipsa loquitur cases, who must
undergo new trials whenever the defendant produces an uncalled witness con-
sidered "material" by an appellate court. Perhaps the entire process of calling
witnesses would be altered, for even where the judge is obviously able to
determine the existence of material witnesses, 22 only the most essential will
be called by the litigants themselves, since by not calling, the party could ques-
tion the witness under the more favorable circumstances of cross-examina-
tion,23 and be assured of a reversal if the witness were not called by the court.
Would the proposal also require courts to assume the tremendous administra-
tive task not only of calling available witnesses but also of taking the deposi-
tions of witnesses who could not be reached by process?
And, finally, there is no reason why the application of Mr. Justice Frank-
also available in civil actions. Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Chalmette Oil Distributing
Co., 143 F.2d 826, 829 (5th Cir. 1944). See also 3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 910. In some
jurisdictions the right of impeachment might be limited by the rule which confines the
cross-examining party to questions relating to information obtained by the opponent's
direct examination. In these jurisdictions, once the party asks about his own case, tile
witness is said to be his own and the rule against impeaching one's own witness would
apply. Id. § 914.
20. The right to ask leading questions only in cross-examination is based on the as-
sumption that the opponent's witness is biased. If the court calls the witness, however,
it would appear that the right to ask leading questions in cross-examination could be
curtailed if the witness is biased in favor of the cross-examiner. 3 WiGmxoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 773.
21. Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY PRoBLEMts 476, 477 (1936).
22. The judge could easily determine the existence of the material witness in the
instant case, because the witness was the fellow-servant whose negligence was the issue
of controversy. Other eyewitnesses to the accident, however, might never be known to
the judge unless specifically mentioned by the parties.
23. See notes 18-20 supra.
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